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A RETROSPECTIVE ON THE 
WOODHOUSE REPORT: THE VISION, 
THE PERFORMANCE AND THE FUTURE 
Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer QC* 
The following is a revised version of the second Woodhouse Memorial Lecture given at both the 
Victoria University of Wellington and the University of Auckland in September 2018. It traces the 
history and policy iterations of New Zealand's accident compensation scheme that flowed from the 
1967 Woodhouse Report (the Report), a Royal Commission report chaired by Sir Owen Woodhouse.  
It discusses the features of the Report and the determination it showed to get rid of the common law 
action for damages for personal injury. It analyses the degree to which the Report was not followed 
in the journey it took through the political decision-making system. There is a critical analysis of the 
delivery of benefits, the administration of the scheme and its financing. The performance in accident 
prevention and rehabilitation is briefly covered. The method of settling disputes in the scheme has 
seen an unwelcome return to legalism. The lecture concludes with a strong plea to remove the 
anomalies created by the accident compensation scheme between the vicitims of accident who receive 
earnings related-benefit and those who are dealt with under the Social Security Act 2018 under which 
they receive flat rate benefits. The lecture concludes with some lessons for policymakers. 
I INTRODUCTION   
This lecture is part of a Festschrift for Professor Gordon Anderson who has given sterling service 
to the Victoria University of Wellington.  He has specialised in employment law and the regulation 
of labour and work. This field used to be the responsibility of the Department of Labour in New 
Zealand, now merged into the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment. The history of the 
Department of Labour, particularly in its earliest days, was notable for radical and world leading 
reforms.  It was from that Department that the accident compensation scheme emerged. Accident 
compensation was world leading. So there is a vital connection between the academic career of 
Gordon Anderson and the contents of this lecture.  
  
*  Distinguished Fellow, Victoria University of Wellington, Faculty of Law; and Global Affiliated Professor, 
University of Iowa, College of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges comments on early versions of this 
paper by Ross Carter, Sir Kenneth Keith, Ben Hinchcliff , Ross Wilson and John Miller. 
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II OWEN WOODHOUSE 
No account of the provenance of the 1967 Woodhouse Report or its contribution to New Zealand 
life can be divorced from the personal qualities of Owen Woodhouse himself. He was a complex, 
multifaceted human being, blessed with both penetrating insight and human empathy.  His 
compassion for people was perhaps his most salient characteristic. The number and range of his 
friends and acquaintances both in New Zealand and overseas was astonishing. 
Owen had the gift of friendship. He inspired loyalty and affection among those with whom he 
interacted and worked. He encountered many tough situations. He was a leader of determination with 
skills honed in the Second World War. He had the capacity to weld a disparate group into a team and 
produce high quality outcomes. It was my great good fortune to meet him when he and the Royal 
Commission investigating workers' compensation visited the University of Chicago Law School in 
1966 where I was a student. It was the beginning of an enduring relationship that changed my life.1   
Owen was a warm-hearted visionary blessed with judgment and wisdom.  He believed those in 
distress should be helped and the well-being of each person should be of concern to all. He looked 
into the future and tried to see how it would be. These qualities were reflected not only in his judicial 
decisions and in his work as President of the Law Commission, but also in the reports on accident law 
he wrote both in New Zealand and Australia.  
In all of this he carried his message through a unique prose style. Always spare, his prose had a 
limpid and crystalline quality. It was the result of painstaking drafting and redrafting. The Woodhouse 
Report in Australia went through nine drafts. He wrote these reports himself. They were powerful, 
elegant and persuasive. As the inaugural Woodhouse lecturer Sir Kenneth Keith said last year, clear 
thinking and clear writing were Owen's hallmark.2  
A The Common Law Origins of Accident Compensation 
New Zealand adopted the common law of England from the earliest days of European settlement. 
The common law of England and of New Zealand developed over time so that people who suffered 
personal injury by accident could recover damages. Assault and battery were always actionable in the 
courts, but the great tort of negligence developed over the latter half of the 19th century and expanded 
in the first half of the 20th. This opened up the possibility of significant awards of damages after a 
civil trial by jury. 
  
1  For an account of the reform efforts in both Australia and New Zealand, see Geoffrey Palmer Compensation 
for Incapacity: A Study of Law and Social Change in New Zealand and Australia (Oxford University Press, 
Wellington, 1979). 
2  Kenneth J Keith "Out of this nettle, danger, we pluck this flower, safety: Promoting safety through law, 
national and international, and by other means" (Sir Owen Woodhouse Memorial Lecture, University of 
Auckland, Auckland, 30 August 2017). 
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To recover this, however, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate the injury resulted from the 
negligence of the defendant. This meant that many injured people could not succeed. There were three 
main defences available: contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff; the notorious defence of 
common employment, where a worker who was injured by the fault of a fellow worker could not 
recover from the employer; and third, that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the risk of sustaining 
injury. These defences were either modified or abolished by statute over time. 
Nevertheless, the plight of the uncompensated victim at common law created a social burden that 
was too heavy to bear.3 Fault could be proved in only a minority of cases. Both England and New 
Zealand adopted workers' compensation statutes around the turn of the 20th century. The New 
Zealand statute provided modest periodic payments related to previous earnings (and hospital and 
medical expenses) to workers who could show their incapacitating injuries arose "out of and in the 
course of the employment".4 Workers' compensation included compensation for disease contracted 
from the employment. It also included some modest lump sum compensation payments for permanent 
loss of bodily function, although these did not match the pain and suffering damages that were 
available for a common law claim. There were also benefits for dependent survivors.  
The liability created by both tort law and workers' compensation led to the need for insurance. 
The advent of the motor car quickly produced many accidents. Negligence on the highway became a 
significant source of common law claims. In 1928, New Zealand cured the problem of the 
impecunious defendant who was negligent but lacked the means to pay for a personal injury judgment 
by implementing compulsory liability insurance connected to the registration of vehicles.5 Insurance 
in relation to liability for work accidents was similarly mandated by statute.  
Meanwhile the welfare state had been developing gradually notably with the passage of the Old-
Age Pensions Act in New Zealand in 1898. The Social Security Act 1938 provided a comprehensive 
system of flat rate payments by the state for people incapacitated through a variety of causes, including 
sickness and invalidity. A public health system was also established by that legislation. 
These twin systems for personal injury proceeded alongside the welfare state without great public 
expression of discontent until the 1960s when a Royal Commission was established by the 
Government and reported in 1967.6 Yet change had been foreshadowed much earlier. Oliver Wendell 
Holmes observed in his famous book on the common law in 1881 that "[t]he state might conceivably 
  
3  See Terence G Ison The Forensic Lottery: A Critique on Tort Liablity as a System of Personal Injury 
Compensation (Staples Press, London, 1967). 
4  Workers' Compensation for Accidents Act 1900, s 6. 
5   Motor-vehicles Insurance (Third-party Risks) Act 1928. 
6  Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government 
Printer, December 1967) [Woodhouse Report]. 
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make itself a mutual insurance company against accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens' 
mishaps amongst all its members."7 
B The Woodhouse Report of 1967 
The three Royal Commissioners, chaired by Sir Owen Woodhouse, then a Judge of the Supreme 
Court, made bold, almost revolutionary recommendations. They were influenced by Sir William 
Beveridge's 1942 report in the United Kingdom.8 What began life as a legal reform became more far 
reaching with serious implications for income support. The resonances of the Report stretched far 
beyond private law into the principles governing public law provision for the welfare of people.   
The Report was written in optimistic, even inspirational, language.9 It stated five simple social 
principles with great clarity. The community had a responsibility to protect all citizens from the 
burden of sudden individual losses, when their ability to contribute to the general welfare by their 
work was interrupted by physical incapacity. An injured person should receive compensation from a 
community financed scheme on the same uniform method of assessment regardless of the cause of 
injury. Emphasis should be on physical and vocational recovery and a real measure of compensation 
for their losses. Real compensation meant earnings related benefits would be paid up to high levels of 
income for the whole period of incapacity. There also needed to be recognition for permanent 
impairment. There should be no delays, inconsistency in assessment or waste in the administration of 
the scheme. 
The Woodhouse Report was notable for the sustained attack it made on the weaknesses of the 
common law action for damages as a compensation system. The prime problem was that tort law 
failed to compensate large numbers of accident victims, but there were other weaknesses:  
• waste was a feature of the system, due to large legal and administrative expenses so that 
much of the money raised never reached the injured;  
• there were long delays in delivering benefits to those who secured them;  
• personal blameworthiness was not the real rationale for the law because negligence law 
required individuals to meet the community average standard;  
• as the Woodhouse Report put it: "[r]eprehensible conduct can be followed by feather blows 
while a moment's inadvertence could call down the heavens";10 
• liability insurance had blunted or removed the deterrent effect of tort law;  
  
7  Oliver Wendell Holmes The Common Law (M DeWolfe Howe (ed), Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 
1963) at 77. This was not a change Holmes favoured.  
8   Social Insurance and Allied Services: Report by Sir William Beveridge (HMSO, Cmd 6404, 1942). 
9  Woodhouse Report, above n 6, at [484]. 
10  At [85]. 
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• an assessment of damages in one lump sum involved guesswork and speculation and tended 
to overcompensate less serious injuries;  
• the process of adjudication was a lottery and impeded the rehabilitation of injured people, 
and there were strong incentives to maximise misery; and  
• accident prevention was impeded by the system.  
The Royal Commission's attack on the utility of the common law action was fundamental to the 
success of the proposals. Unless that action was removed there could be no comprehensive scheme. 
Five principles underpinned the Commission's recommendations: community responsibility, 
comprehensive entitlement, complete rehabilitation, real compensation and administrative efficiency. 
In reality, however, many of the detailed recommendations were altered in the political processes that 
followed the 1967 report.11 
All of tort law was to be swept away for personal injury. Everyone who was injured by accident 
– whether it was at work, on the road, at play or anywhere else – would be compensated. And virtually 
no new money would be needed. It would all be paid for out of the funds that were compulsorily 
exacted to pay for the tort system and the workers' compensation system. That was because these 
systems not only denied many people adequate compensation, but they cost a lot to run – as much as 
40 per cent of the total money collected by statute to fund the schemes.  Much of the money was 
chewed up by insurance companies, the costs of investigations into fault and by the costs of litigation. 
The basic thrust of the Woodhouse reform was to collapse all the existing programmes and replace 
them with one comprehensive co-ordinated system of earnings-related compensation for all incapacity 
resulting from injury. The scheme provided twenty-four hour protection for all accident victims, 
without the need to exact new taxes to pay for it.  
The Woodhouse Report contained a radical programme and the National Government took time 
to study it. An official commentary exploring the feasibility of the proposals, their costings and 
suggesting some possible changes, gave the scheme a vote of confidence.12 It was then examined at 
length by a parliamentary Select Committee. In the end the scheme was adopted but with a substantial 
number of changes.  
C What Happened to the Woodhouse Report 
The scheme from the Royal Commission looked most attractive to the public. But adopting it took 
time, as it involved depriving insurance companies of a significant portion of their business and 
  
11  Palmer, above n 1. See also Geoffrey Palmer "New Zealand's Accident Compensation Scheme Twenty Years 
On" (1994) 44 UTLJ 223; and Geoffrey Palmer "The Design of Compensation Systems: Tort Principles Rule, 
OK?" (1995) 29 Val UL Rev 1115. 
12  Personal Injury: A Commentary on the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry Into Compensation for 
Personal Injury in New Zealand (Government Printer, October 1969). 
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transferring those funds to the state. This feature made some in the ruling National Government 
nervous.  
The scheme was finally adopted and became operative on 1 April 1974. Significant changes to 
the Royal Commission's recommendations were made in the political process and some of those 
decisions have not produced the best results. The 1972 Act did not cover non-earners as originally 
passed, but when a Labour Government was elected in late 1972, the coverage was extended to include 
them. The Act, however, was not redone so the logic of comprehensive coverage was not reflected in 
the legislation. The administrative arrangements have changed over the years. Changes in what is 
covered by the scheme have been adjusted from time to time. While the Royal Commission 
recommended a "pay-as-you-go" method of financing the scheme, there have been significant efforts 
to accumulate funds. A large capital fund has been built up and is invested, so the scheme looks in 
part like an actuarially-based private insurance scheme. At one point in the 1990s, significant parts of 
the scheme were privatised, but that was later reversed.  
Altogether, only about half of the major policy recommendations in the Woodhouse Report were 
implemented. Key provisions were rejected. This makes it difficult to judge how the Woodhouse 
reform model would have worked had it been enacted more substantially in the terms that it 
recommended.13 The Woodhouse Report has not been tried yet. The major policy issues upon which 
the Woodhouse approach did not prevail included the administrative arrangements, the methods of 
financing, the compensation payments themselves, particularly opposition to lump sums and the 
design of the systems for determining disputes about eligibility, and the causes of, and the degree of, 
incapacity.  Had the Report been followed, it would have been easier to integrate the scheme into the 
rest of the income support system.  
Another matter that is relevant in light of recent experience flows from the manner in which the 
Royal Commission envisaged claims being dealt with. At paragraph 309(b) of the Report the 
Commission said:14 
Informal and simple procedure should be the key to all proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Board. 
Applications should not be made to depend upon any formal type of claim, adversary techniques should 
not be used, and a drift to legalism avoided. 
That aim has clearly not been achieved. Indeed, there have been constant difficulties about how to 
resolve disputed cases and the District Court was brought in to decide cases some years ago. More 
than 45 years after the enactment of this scheme, one thing has remained constant. There has been no 
political appetite on any side of politics to return to the common law action for damages of the past. 
  
13  Geoffrey Palmer "What Happened to the Woodhouse Report?" [1981] NZLJ 561. 
14  Woodhouse Report, above n 6, at [309(b)] (footnotes omitted). 
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That consensus is founded on the clear evidence that, had the previous system been retained, it would 
be costing significantly more than accident compensation.  
The Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) has developed into a large and significant public 
organisation with a big footprint on New Zealand life. The 2017 Annual Report stated that it had 
3,500 staff. It received 1.95 million new claims. It paid 85.8 per cent of total expenditure either 
directly to claimants or for services for them. It has an investment portfolio of $37,300,000,000. That 
year it reported improved satisfaction levels from claimants after several years of lower ratings. In 
2017, 30.6 per cent of the population received compensation or rehabilitation services from the 
Corporation. The average time to commence weekly compensation payments was seven days. While 
formal reviews numbered only 2.7 per cent of entitlement claims, 81.7 per cent of them were upheld. 
The average time for resolution of claims with reviews was 94.8 days. Of the claimants, 68.4 per cent 
had returned to work within 10 weeks and 93.1 per cent had returned to work within nine months. 
Levies exacted for the scheme amounted to 1.6 per cent of gross domestic product.15 In September 
2018 ACC announced it was "doubling its investment in a huge business transformation programme 
to $669 million, forecasting that it would make its staff an extra 10 per cent more productive".16  
D Finance, Delivery and Administration 
An important issue in the financing of the scheme has been the debate between the relative merits 
of "pay-as-you-go" compared with a fully funded scheme. Private insurance schemes have to be fully 
funded in order to ensure that the insurance company can meet the costs as the claims run off. This 
can take many years, especially in a scheme that pays benefits for a long time, for example in the case 
of those seriously injured and incapacitated when young. Actuaries can assess these risks, based on a 
combination of empirical data and assumptions, and arrive at assessments of the funds required in 
order to meet the future payments. Governments do not have to do this. They can increase or reduce 
the levies as things change. Obviously it is prudent to have substantial reserves in case of catastrophe 
so that collecting more than is needed for a period is wise – this is called a partially funded scheme.  
Clearly, at the beginning there are only a few people who are permanently incapacitated and it 
takes 15 or 20 years for the scheme to reach its full costs or "plateaus". Therefore, it is wise to cost 
the whole thing on a "plateau" basis, even though during the first year only those injured during the 
first year would be paid. Thus, substantial funds are available for investment.  
In discussing this question, the Royal Commission said it was necessary to take in more than was 
needed in the first few years. But it observed at paragraph 479:17 
  
15  Accident Compensation Corporation Investing in New Zealanders: Annual Report 2017 (September, 2017). 
16  Tom Pullar-Strecker "ACC 'doubles down' with $669m transformation project" The Dominion Post 
(Wellington, 5 September 2018) at 23. 
17  Woodhouse Report, above n 6, at [479]. 
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As the scheme will be a Government scheme of social insurance it must in the final resort recieve the 
backing of the State. It is for this reason that a formal system of funding cannot be regarded as essential 
to the stability of the scheme. 
The extraordinary gyrations over the scheme's funding over the years indicate misunderstanding as to 
its real nature. Changes in policy in New Zealand at various times have caused the costs of the scheme 
to become items of public controversy when a more sophisticated understanding and better policies 
could have avoided such problems.  
Employers objected in the 1980s to the levies they were paying because reserves were being 
accumulated by the scheme. They had also sought and obtained variable levies rather than the flat rate 
levies recommended by the Woodhouse Report. An amendment Act in 1982 removed the requirement 
that levies should be set on a fully funded basis, allowing future levies to be set on a "pay-as-you-go" 
basis. This produced a short-term reduction in levies and a subsequent blowout in the levy rates and 
a running down of the reserves. When the levies had to be increased again as a result there was further 
criticism.18 The result has been that these levies are not regarded so much as a tax as an insurance 
premium in which the employers and self-employed have a vital interest. They see it as an opportunity 
where they can minimise their costs, for example by reclassifying the risk category into which their 
staff fall.19  
Related to these efforts by employers were the efforts to privatise the scheme. The Accident 
Rehabilitation and Compensation Insurance Act 1992 reduced the benefits offered by the scheme. 
The changes included the abolition of lump sum compensation and payment for partial loss, the 
introduction of insurance language into the Act, limits on compensation for medical misadventure, 
limits on rehabilitation payments and work capacity testing. Most of these changes did not endure.   
Then there was the short-lived experiment to allow private insurance companies to write insurance 
for the earners' scheme that was passed in 1998 and repealed by the new Labour Government that 
came into office in 1999. The scheme was changed in 1998 to provide for full funding, a necessary 
prelude to the introduction of competition from insurance companies. But when Labour repealed the 
privatisation it retained full funding. This seems to have been because of the decision to consolidate 
the Corporation's financial performance onto the Crown's balance sheet. With the accrual accounting 
required by the Public Finance Act 1989, this means that the future costs of the scheme and those 
seriously injured who will be on it for many years are reflected in the government accounts. The logic 
  
18  Don Rennie "Administering Accident Compensation in the 1980s" (2003) 34 VUWLR 329 at 333. 
19  Over the years there has been significant debate in the academic literature as to whether internalisation of 
accident costs can be achieved by risk-related levies, thereby deterring accidents. See Guido Calabresi The 
Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1970); and Don 
Dewees, David Duff and Michael Trebilcock Exploring the Domain of Accident Law: Taking the Facts 
Seriously (Oxford University Press, New York, 1996). But to design a practical scheme that effectively 
achieves this goal seems impossible.  
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of this approach does not square with the manner in which the future costs for education and health 
are dealt with in the public accounts.  
Social insurance is quite a different concept from private insurance. The Woodhouse scheme was 
about the social goals and social purposes of a compassionate and just society. Some of the attacks on 
the scheme by some economists have been full of assertion about inefficiency, moral hazard and 
policy failure, objections that seem to be based more on neo-liberal ideology than on sound 
economics. Likewise, a proper understanding of the purpose of New Zealand's scheme suggests that 
privatisation is no more appropriate for accident compensation than for benefits under the Social 
Security Act 1964.  
There have been many statutory reconstructions, administrative changes and variations since the 
scheme began in 1973. The Woodhouse Report recommended the scheme be brought to life by an 
independent three-person Commission, with its own staff. This recommendation was heavily 
influenced by the organisation of the then Ontario Workmen's Compensation Board.  But since the 
new scheme involved a partial merger with some aspects of the then social security system, it should 
operate under the general responsibility of the Minister of Social Security (now the Ministry of Social 
Development) and be attached to that department for administrative purposes. That never happened 
and it remained with the Department of Labour, that was much later absorbed into the Ministry of 
Business, Innovation and Employment.  
The changes in the 1982 Act, however, set a pattern that essentially survives to this day. The 
administrative change was to abolish the Accident Compensation Commission and to substitute for it 
a statutory corporation presided over by a board.  Section 267 of the Accident Compensation Act 
2001 provides for a board of not more than eight members appointed by the Minister under the Crown 
Entities Act 2004. While there is a Minister for ACC, ministerial responsibility is attenuated by virtue 
of the Corporation's legal and administrative form.20 
The purpose of the 1982 policy appears to have been to try to insert a degree of stakeholder 
participation into the policy settings. It was also aimed at bringing a more business like set of 
management processes to the bureaucracy. It became in 1982 a rather different organisation. In time, 
practices developed that permitted a measure of privatisation subsequently enacted by the National 
Government in the late 1990s.  
Neither the independent Accident Compensation Commission of three Commissioners in the first 
instance, nor the later statutory corporation, were organised as part of the core state services. Thus, 
the accident compensation system became something of a policy orphan within government. What is 
now the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, has responsibility for policy advice. A 
search of its website does not disclose great activity or even much information concerning its policy 
  
20  Geoffrey Palmer "'The Nineteen-Seventies': Summary for Presentation to the Accident Compensation 
Symposium" (2003) 34 VUWLR 239. 
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function.21 Accident compensation is listed as one of the Ministry's regulatory systems for which it 
is responsible, but is it really a regulatory system? The Ministry does consult on new regulations to 
be made under the statute.  In practice, policy has often been developed by the Commission and later 
the Corporation itself and then submitted to the Ministry.  The policy-generating capacity of the ACC 
itself has turned out to be somewhat haphazard and unsatisfactory. The Treasury has always taken a 
strong interest in the scheme because of the quantity of public funds involved in it.  Uneasy tensions 
inhabit the shared interests in the scheme of various parts of the government and these are not easily 
resolved. 
It is doubtful that the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment has been an effective 
adviser. It does not seem to have been able to provide advice to avoid the various policy mistakes that 
have occurred, although perhaps they were the work of ministers.  The policy advice problem is 
structural and will not be cured until the structure is altered. Further, the Corporation was left aside 
from deliberations within the core government departments for long periods of time. The result was 
that there was insufficient integration of policy advice within the workings of central government or 
the relationship of the scheme to the other programmes for income support. 
The administrative problems that have been encountered by the accident compensation scheme 
over the years could have been avoided to a substantial extent if the original policy prescription had 
been followed. The corporate form of organisation has engendered substantial public resistance at 
various times since it suggests a business for profit rather than social insurance. It is an outlier within 
the government system. A number of controversies have beset it in recent times and there has been a 
recent independent inquiry over claim handling.22 Over time efforts have been made to turn the 
scheme into something that it is not and was never intended to be. Having a board has not in my view 
added value. A department of state would never have behaved in the way that the Corporation has 
done in respect to recent controversies. It would be better to hand the administration over to a 
department of state operating on the conventional principles of ministerial responsibility.23  
  
21  Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment "Search Results for 'Accident Compensation'" 
<www.mbie.govt.nz/search>. 
22  Miriam R Dean "Independent Review of the Acclaim Otago (Inc) July 2015 Report into Accident 
Compensation Dispute Resolution Processes" (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, May 2016) 
[Dean Inquiry Report]. In July 2018 a careful three-part piece of investigative journalism drew attention to a 
number of  issues: Cate Broughton "When ACC says No" The Dominion Post (Wellington, 16 July 2018) at 
14; "Battle lines in the fight for ACC" The Dominion Post (Wellington, 18 July 2018) at 16–17; "ACC 'can't 
keep going the way it is'" The Dominion Post (Wellington, 20 July 2018); and Don Rennie "ACC and the 
Woodhouse Principles: Comprehensive Entitlement" (2018) 919 Lawtalk 19. 
23  On the administrative structures erected see John R Martin "Establishment of the Accident Compensation 
Commission 1973: Administrative Challenges" (2003) 34 VUWLR 249. 
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E Accident Prevention and Rehabilitation 
The Royal Commission report stressed the primacy of accident prevention and rehabilitation of 
accident victims as having priority over the issue of payment of compensation. That aim never seems 
to have been fully achieved. New Zealand never received what was envisaged: a "unified and 
comprehensive scheme of accident prevention, rehabilitation, and compensation".24 There has been 
more emphasis and political attention upon paying the compensation than there has been on either 
accident prevention or rehabilitation, although significant amounts of ACC funds are spent on 
rehabilitation. What has prevented this in part was the overlapping responsibilities of various 
government departments. The ACC system makes a large contribution to health spending but the 
carriage of the health system is with the Ministry of Health. ACC is not the prime mover in either the 
rehabilitation arena or in accident prevention.  
Rehabilitation by ACC has been the subject of critical and knowledgeable commentary by Don 
Rennie, the convenor of the New Zealand Law Society's Accident Compensation Committee. He 
writes:25 
The ACC should be a world leader in the rehabilitation of injured people covered by the Act, but for many 
years it appears that getting claimants "off the system" has taken priority over ensuring that a claimant's 
health, independence and participation for [(despite)] all the ongoing consequences of the injury…The 
ACC cannot claim it has an outstanding or even a successful record in achieving what the Woodhouse 
Report recommended in providing all accident victims with complete rehabilitation. 
It was thought that comprehensive injury statistics could be generated from the new scheme and in-
depth analysis applied to the statistics, thus providing new opportunities for preventing serious 
accidents. The ACC website does have data on claims statistics over the past five years.26 But this 
has taken too long to arrive. The Statistics New Zealand website concentrates primarily on work injury 
statistics and one is left with the impression that the new data that should have been unearthed by the 
scheme has not been adequately captured or analysed.27 It should be noted the light-handed regulatory 
model in New Zealand in relation to health and safety at work failed, as found by an inquiry into a 
coal mine accident in which 29 men lost their lives.28 This and other failings led to the repeal of the 
Health and Safety at Work Act 1992 and the enactment of Health and Safety and Work Act 2015 
which is anything but light-handed.   
  
24  Woodhouse Report, above n 6, at [488(1)]. 
25  Don Rennie "ACC and the Woodhouse Principles: Complete Rehabilitation" (2018) 920 Lawtalk 40. 
26  Accident Compensation Corporation "Statistics on our claims" <www.acc.co.nz>. 
27  Statistics New Zealand "Injuries" <www.stats.govt.nz>  
28  Graham Panckhurst, Stewart Bell and David Henry Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy: 
Volume 1 + Overview (October 2012) at 32. 
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Changing the administration of ACC needs to be considered. It can be strongly argued that if the 
accident compensation system was administered through a department of state, this would ensure that 
the policy-making for the scheme would be better considered and better aligned with other income 
support programmes designed to alleviate poverty.   
F A Return to Legalism? 
Over the years the accident compensation legislation has become longer and more complex. It is 
less generous than when it began and more restrictive. It now covers 338 pages of the statute book. 
The first enactment was the Accident Compensation Act 1972, amended to cover non-earners in 1973.  
A new Act with the same name followed in 1982. This was replaced by the Accident Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Insurance Act 1992, then briefly the Accident Insurance Act 1998, and the present 
Accident Compensation Act 2001. This last Act began life as the Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation 
and Compensation Act but was renamed by a 2010 amendment. And there were also many 
amendments of those Acts made in the intervening years. These Acts bear the marks of ideological 
battles as their titles indicate. 
The lines of demarcation that are drawn in the current legislation are technical, difficult and 
sometimes unfair. The problems facing claimants are formidable. The obstacles have been 
deliberately increased over the years.  If claimants read the statute they would have little chance of 
understanding it. The legislation seems unfit for the social purpose for which it is designed. What has 
developed is not what the designers envisaged. Here is what the Chief Justice said about the Act in a 
2012 Supreme Court decision:29 
The Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Compensation Act 2001 provides cover on the basis of line-
drawing which reflects policy choices. Such line-drawing has resulted in legislation which is technical. 
Approaches taken to the interpretation of provisions under earlier accident compensation legislation need 
to be treated with some caution in considering the current legislation. Nor is this easy legislation to follow. 
It contains much cross-referencing, repetition, and circularity in expression. 
Applicants dissatisfied with the Corporation's decision can undertake a review before an 
independent reviewer, who conducts a hearing. This is organised by a company contracted to the 
ACC, an arrangement that seems anomalous for a responsibility of the state.30 Either side can then 
appeal to the District Court. From there, there can be an appeal on a point of law to the High Court, 
and from there to the Court of Appeal with leave. The decision of that court is final, meaning cases 
cannot be taken to the Supreme Court.31 A search of the Ministry of Justice's "Judicial Decisions 
  
29   Allenby v H [2012] NZSC 33, [2012] 3 NZLR 425 at [7] per Elias CJ. 
30  The review process is organised and run by a company, FairWay Resolution Ltd.  
31  Accident Compensation Act 2001, ss 134–163 deal with dispute determination. 
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Online" records shows that there were 437 accident compensation cases in the High Court and Court 
Appeal between 2003 and February 2018.32 There probably have been thousands in the District Court.   
This was a scheme to do away with the need for lawyers when claiming compensation for personal 
injury. Now the legislation is so intricate that lawyers are often needed. Constant legislative fiddling 
with the scheme has produced injustices. Eligibility depends upon which of the statutes the injured 
person may be subject to and sorting out the transitional problems as between the various Acts passed 
over the years is something of a legal tangle. ACC has become highly legalistic, and this has created 
unfairness. The way in which medical evidence is used to deny claims has attracted much vocal 
opposition in the community. An extensive research project from the Faculty of Law at the University 
of Otago found that the ACC legislation was being administered unfairly in some cases. The research 
concludes:33 
Over time, causation has come to be applied in a narrow, technical, legalistic way. Because of this, any 
dispute with ACC involves legal advice, legal representation, and complex medical evidence. Causation 
is inherently arguable and difficult to assess. 
As the Otago research finds, the approach is redolent of how the subject was approached in the old 
tort system. Efforts have been made to improve the dispute settlement system since 2015 and make it 
fairer. At the time of writing, nothing concrete has eventuated, although efforts are continuing.34 
G The Future Pattern of Income Support and ACC 
The New Zealand accident compensation scheme has been through many iterations since it was 
first passed by Parliament in 1972. One constant feature has been the discrimination in public 
programmes that relieve the consequences of some misfortunes and disabilities but not others. One 
lottery replaced another. The person laid low by cancer, a heart attack or stroke is treated much less 
generously than the person who suffers an accidental injury resulting in the same incapacity. The first 
group is easily impoverished by the drop in income compared with the person receiving compensation 
under ACC.  As Professors Walter Blum and Harry Kalven Jr, whom Owen visited at Chicago, wrote 
  
32  Ministry of Justice "Judicial Decisions Online" <www.justice.govt.nz>.  
33  Warren Forster, Tom Barraclough and Tiho Mijatov Solving the Problem: Causation, transparency and 
access to justice in New Zealand's personal injury system (University of Otago Faculty of Law Legal Issues 
Centre, 22 May 2017) at 1. For the legal issues see also Ben Thompson Accident Compensation Act: Key 
Sections and Commentary (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2014); and Stephen Todd (ed) The Law of Torts in New 
Zealand (7th ed, Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2016) chs 2 and 3.  
34  The Dean Inquiry Report published in 2016, above n 22, found there were inefficiencies in the dispute 
resolution system. There were at least four significant problems: being heard, access to the law, access to 
evidence and access to representation. While efforts are being made to improve the system and the ACC is 
working on it, nothing of substance had eventuated at the time of writing. See Accident Compensation 
Corporation "Update to Minister on implementing Dean Review recommendations" (26 February 2018) 
<www.acc.co.nz>. 
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in 1965 concerning the then efforts to provide better redress for the victims of automobile accidents 
in the United States:35 
Private law cannot borrow goals from public law fields without accepting the obligation to make a proper 
public law analysis. In the case of automobile compensation plans, such an analysis shows that the special 
problem cannot be solved adequately without solving the larger problem. 
The larger problem was poverty and while accident compensation has reduced poverty in New 
Zealand compared with what went before it, it certainly has not eliminated it.   
The explanation for the discrimination in New Zealand revolves around the shortage of available 
money and changing political priorities.36 First, in 1975 there was an election campaign in which 
superannuation for people over 60 was the single most important issue. This development effectively 
removed the issue of financing an extension of the accident compensation principles to sickness and 
invalidity off the agenda for many years. Expenditure on the aged as a result went up 57.6 per cent, 
although this reduced later when the age of eligibility for superannuation was increased to the age of 
65. The second reason for failure to act, although less important than the first, was the fact that the 
1972 Royal Commission of Inquiry into Social Security in New Zealand had not recommended 
anything along the lines of the 1967 Woodhouse Report.37 An effort was made by a later Royal 
Commission to deal with the issues but with no legislative result.38 The Fourth Labour Government 
introduced the Rehabilitation and Incapacity Bill 1990, based on a Law Commission report when Sir 
Owen Woodhouse was its President.39 The Bill was designed to extend the scheme to sickness, but it 
was not proceeded with by the incoming National Government. 
The Woodhouse Report in New Zealand, and the later inquiry Sir Owen Woodhouse chaired for 
the Australian Government that reported in 1974, were intended to overtake the flat rate benefit system 
and apply to all forms of income maintenance for incapacity, including those resulting from sickness 
and congenital incapacity.40 For a number of reasons the aim of integration has never been achieved 
  
35   Walter J Blum and Harry Kalven Jr Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem: Auto Compensation 
Plans (Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1965) at 85. 
36  For background to the policy developments see the essays in Geoffrey Palmer (ed) The Welfare State Today 
– Social Welfare Policy in New Zealand in the Seventies (Fourth Estate Books, Wellington, 1977). 
37  Social Security in New Zealand: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (Government Printer, 1972). 
38  The April Report Volume II: Future Directions – Report of the Royal Commission on Social Policy 
(Government Printer, April 1988) at 757.  
39  See Law Commission Personal Injury: Prevention and Recovery – Report on the Accident Compensation 
Scheme (NZLC R4, 1988). 
40  Compensation and Rehabilitation in Australia: Report of the National Committee of Inquiry (Australian 
Government Publishing Service, 1974). 
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but the issues need to be addressed. Serious social inequalities stem from the preferential treatment 
enjoyed by accident victims not only in income support but also in the rehabilitation available. 
Long standing complaints about the sad state of the law in the Social Security Act 1964 led to a 
significant project to rewrite it that lasted for years and spanned two governments. Judges had 
commented adversely upon the Act. In 2014, I stated that the 1964 Act "has been a convoluted mess 
for many years, despite its vital importance to many thousands of people".41 It was a top candidate 
for the booby prize as the worst statute on the New Zealand books. The Social Security Legislation 
Rewrite Bill began for a second time under the National Government and was introduced to 
Parliament in 2016. The Ardern Government amended the Bill, although National's Bill had been 
substantially amended in the Committee of the Whole House.42 
In the first reading debate on 10 May 2016 of the Social Security Legislation Rewrite Bill, the 
Hon Anne Tolley said:43  
This Bill rewrites the Social Security Act 1964. After more than 50 years the Social Security Act is long 
overdue for a rewrite. When it was first passed it had 135 sections. It has since grown to 523 sections and, 
of those, only four remain unchanged, 214 sections have been repealed, and most sections have been 
amended multiple times—in one case, 286 times. Altogether, that makes for a very disjointed and 
confusing Act … 
An earlier amendment Act, the Social Security (Benefit Categories and Work Focus) Amendment 
Act 2013 s 62 and pt 1 of sch 2, amended the 1964 Act to reorganise headings and "make clearer [the] 
  
41  Geoffrey Palmer "Law-Making in New Zealand: Is There A Better Way?" (2014) 22 Wai L Rev 1 at 4. 
42   (8 May 2018) 729 NZPD (Social Security Legislation Rewrite Bill 2016 – Second Reading, Hon Carmel 
Sepuloni); and Supplementary Order Paper 2018 (25) Social Security Rewrite Bill 2018 (122-1) summarised 
the changes as: (1) "[r]emoving some identified changes to effect of current law"; (2) "[a]dding some minor 
changes or clarifications to effect of current law"; (3) "[m]aking some minor drafting corrections or 
improvements"; and (4) "[u]pdating since Bill reported on 14 September 2016 from Social Services 
Committee".    
43  (10 May 2016) 713 NZPD 10897. The 2016 Rewrite Bill was also the subject of a report under s 7 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 – as noted by Hon Anne Tolley in her first reading speech: "[t]he Attorney-
General's report on this bill identifies a group of provisions that favour people who are totally blind and finds 
that it is inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. These provisions are some of the most 
longstanding social security measures in New Zealand, dating back to 1924. They help a small group of 
disadvantaged people: those who are totally blind. These longstanding measures are re-enacted unchanged in 
the bill as part of the policy-neutral approach. They will remain lawful under the Act." Notably the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal in 2008 said any (assumed) prohibited discrimination on the ground of disability 
(assuming disability could include "cause of disability", such as multiple sclerosis): "[t]he costs of illness 
were to continue to be provided by the state's health system and/or private insurance. That policy choice, 
albeit it may give rise to anomalies of the sort raised by the applicant, constitutes a justified limit in terms of 
[the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990] s 5." See Trevethick v Ministry of Health [2009] NZAR 18 (CA) 
at [18] per Ellen France J for the Court (Chambers, Arnold and Ellen France JJ). 
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principal Act's structure" by "retrofitting" or overlaying a series of Part and other headings. This was 
needed to signal when the provisions of the 1964 Act as amended switched from one topic to another 
topic, but it also made clear that the 1964 Act as amended meandered from one topic to another and 
intermixed substantive and administrative provisions – it no longer had a coherent overall structure 
or scheme.44 
The result of this project was a massive Bill of 501 pages (including revision-tracked 
amendments) considered by the Committee of the Whole House, and split into, and reported back as, 
three Bills – the Social Security Act 2018 (450 pages), the Residential Care and Disability Support 
Services Act 2018 (46 pages) and the Artificial Limb Service Act 2018 (9 pages). The Bills were 
enacted in September 2018. The Social Security Act 1964 remained in force until 26 November 2018 
and provided the legal basis for most of those benefits.     
The Rewrite Bill as introduced was intended to be policy neutral but the Labour Party and the 
Greens could not support it because it contained a number of new measures that they thought were 
not neutral.45 The Ardern Government took up the measure that was on the Order Paper and changed 
it significantly. The Rewrite Bill as enacted can be seen as a stocktake and platform for further change. 
This is especially because of its "policy neutral" approach and because it is not a reforming measure 
for any political party. Its reorganisation makes plainer the current landscape and structure of the law. 
This by itself helps make clear the issues and problems of the current law and what is needed to make 
coherent changes, for example, to introduce a new entitlement such as the Winter Energy Payment.46 
It may be remarked, however that all is not well in a system that requires a policy neutral rewrite in 
order to find out where we are so that more significant changes can be made.   
Hon Carmel Sepuloni and Jan Logie signalled on 28 May 2018 that further work is to be done on 
reforms: areas that the Welfare Expert Advisory Group has been asked to focus on. These range from 
issues from considering the overall purpose of the system, through to specific recommendations on 
the current obligations and sanctions regime.47 That there is more work to do is from my point of 
  
44  Social Security (Benefit Categories and Work Focus) Amendment Act 2013, s 62.  
45  Political parties' positions as the Bill progressed are observable in part from the Hansard related to the Rewrite 
Bill: (10 May 2016) 713 NZPD 10897; (8 May 2018) 729 NZPD (Social Security Legislation Rewrite Bill – 
Second Reading); (15 May 2018) 729 NZPD (Social Security Legislation Rewrite Bill – In Committee); (23 
May 2018) 729 NZPD (Social Security Legislation Rewrite Bill – In Committee); (24 May 2018) 729 NZPD 
(Social Security Legislation Rewrite Bill – In Committee); (4 July 2018) 729 NZPD (Social Security 
Legislation Rewrite Bill – In Committee); and (24 July 2018) 729 NZPD (Social Security Legislation Rewrite 
Bill – In Committee). See also Social Services Committee Social Security Legislation Rewrite Bill: As 
reported from the Social Services Committee – Commentary (14 September 2016). 
46  Work and Income "Winter Energy Payment" <www.workandincome.govt.nz>. 
47  Hon Carmel Sepuloni "Expert group established to provide independent advice on welfare system 
improvements" (press release, 28 May 2018); and Stacey Kirk "Government appoints 11-strong advisory 
panel to advisory panel to overhaul welfare system" (28 May 2018) Stuff  <www.stuff.co.nz>. See also Sarah 
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view an understatement. There appears to be no current move to integrate accident compensation into 
the rest of the welfare system. But there are other issues too. Some benefits are inflation or wage 
adjusted and some are not. And where they are adjusted there is not a consistent pattern, especially 
comparing superannuation adjustments with social security benefits. Further, more onerous 
obligations are placed on some claimants than upon others. There remains a lack of policy consistency 
even with the rewritten Act. It must be said, however, that the rewrite is a leap forward in terms of 
clarity, accessibility and for the rule of law.  
Issues about the fairness of the method of handling disputes in this area tends to mirror what I 
have said about the ACC dispute settlement mechanism. The new Social Security Act 2018 Part 7 
contains provisions on "[r]eviews and appeals". The Part has a Guide. But the system is quite complex 
and more procedural material will be in regulations. Appeals to the High Court continue to be on a 
question of law only. It can be challenging to test the Ministry of Social Development's decisions, 
even successfully. A recent High Court decision from Justice Paul Davison stands as a powerful 
example.48 The dispute appears to have lasted seven years so far.  
Ms F is a solo parent with two dependent children. Between 2005 and 2010 she received the 
Domestic Purposes Benefit as well as other forms of assistance under the Social Security Act 1964. 
In 2010 following a tip-off from Ms F's ex-partner, the Ministry of Social Development commenced 
an investigation into her financial circumstances and reviewed her benefit entitlements. It found she 
had received income from various additional sources and as a consequence had been paid more than 
she was entitled to in the form of social security assistance. The Ministry sought to recover $109,852 
in overpayments. She appealed the decision to the Benefits Review Committee, thence to the Social 
Security Appeal Authority. Both sides appealed from there by way of case stated on points of law to 
the High Court. 
The Judge decided that the Authority had erred in its interpretation as to what constitutes income 
under the definition contained in the Social Security Act, although it had got some of it right. A loan 
from her mother was not income, if it was a loan, since it had to be paid back. Her credit card 
expenditure was not income either. But money from other unknown sources was income. Her 
spending from bank loans borrowed on the security of her home to meet living expenses was not 
income. So Ms F prevailed in the most important issues in the case but it had to be sent back to the 
Authority to deal with the facts concerning the nature of the advance from her mother as to whether 
it was loan or gift. 
Several points arise here. First, it seems wrong that in this class of case that the senior courts are 
not more involved. Important points of statutory interpretation should not be finally decided by 
  
Robson "Govt to scrap benefit cuts for mums who don't name father" (14 November 2017) Radio New 
Zealand <www.radionz.co.nz>. 
48  F v Ministry of Social Development [2018] NZHC 1607, [2018] 3 NZLR 260. 
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tribunals with appeals possible only on points of law. In the case above, the High Court could not 
make findings of fact or even effectively review them. Second, it seems wrong that such a matter 
should last so long, and be so complex. Third, it is wrong in principle that matters of such significance 
to so many people cannot, except by exceptional procedural manoeuvring, be decided by the Supreme 
Court. The same is true for ACC cases. Such restrictions are not compatible with a proper 
understanding of the rule of law in a democracy.      
It is hard to resist the conclusion that income support programmes in New Zealand have developed 
in a haphazard and unprincipled way that is both confusing and unnecessarily complicated. Earnings-
related benefits for accident victims with some lump sum compensation for non-economic loss is 
provided under ACC. Flat rate income tested benefits are provided for those who are sick or are 
otherwise incapacitated. Tax rebates are also available for some people and there exist a wide variety 
of special benefits. 
A generous and nearly universal scheme for those over the age of 65 is provided regardless of 
assets or income by the New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001. The Act 
includes the New Zealand Superannuation fund designed to provide resources to meet the present and 
future costs of superannuation. Nevertheless, substantial evidence exists that future demographic 
pressures will render the scheme unsustainable. The KiwiSaver Act 2006 provides for a voluntary 
retirement savings scheme to which both employees and employers contribute. 
Taken as a whole, an objective observer might be pardoned for thinking that the entire income 
support system in New Zealand amounts to a new form of feudalism where different classes of people 
are subject to unequal distinctions lacking in principle.49 The state provides for people but with 
different hoops to be jumped through with different results in the amount of help available. The 
dependence upon the state is strong so it is important that the law of governing these matters is as free 
from discretion as possible, is clearly stated and is fair.  
The Work and Income website provides links to 62 different benefits and payments that people 
can apply for.50 The variety is quite remarkable. The Inland Revenue Department (IRD) has done 
work on the five social policies it administers – Working for Families, child support, student loan 
repayments and KiwiSaver. The 2017 IRD consultation paper "Making Tax Simpler: Better 
Administration of Social Policy" shows the challenges involved in delivering social policies within a 
tax administration programme and the need for improvements. The Working for Families programme 
provides a variety of tax credits for families with children up into generous income levels, depending 
  
49  Charles A Reich "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale LJ 733 at 770. The law of real property, particularly 
estates in land, is based to a substantial extent on concepts that flow from English feudalism after the Norman 
Conquest.  
50  Work and Income "A-Z benefits and payments" <www.workandincome.govt.nz>. 
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on the number of children.51 Another complication flows from the provisions of the Veterans' Support 
Act 2014, recently reviewed.52   
Considered as a whole, the totality of the income support system could be seen as an incomplete 
negative income tax scheme or looked at another way, a guaranteed minimum income. Such an 
approach does not look out of the question when one examines the disparate New Zealand support 
programmes as whole.  We may be moving in that direction. Gail Duncan has stated:53 
The income of a beneficiary needs to be reframed as being an income the recipient is entitled to as an 
economic unit in New Zealand society, rather than being a burden or inconvenience to the taxpayer. 
The need to produce some coherence out of these disparate programmes seems to me to be 
pressing. The present pattern is the antithesis of joined-up government. It ought not to be beyond us 
to review the whole disjointed picture and provide a unified, integrated scheme for income support 
for all forms of disability and retirement based on carefully articulated principles.  Entitlements needs 
to be clearly defined in the legislation that people can understand, and as free from discretion as 
possible. Dispute settlement needs to be simple and cheap, freed from legalism as far as possible. 
Such a step would help us to deal with the social problems resulting from poverty that is such a 
contemporary challenge.  
Any re-engineering of the New Zealand version of the welfare state will be politically difficult. 
At present, matters are both confused and complex. We face a number of foreseeable challenges. A 
new simplicity based on fairness is called for. Increased life expectancy poses serious issues for 
universal retirement income on the current basis. The overall affordability issue will always be present 
given the high cost of all transfer payments. What can be afforded and how that ranks in terms of 
political priorities are issues that will never go away. The future of work, and the degree to which new 
technology may render jobs more scare, must be factored into the equation. Accident compensation 
took income support to higher income brackets. Is this preferable to redistribution to the less well-
off?  Levels of immigration pose issues as well, what are our obligations to people who arrive here? 
The prospect of increased migration caused by climate change in the future cannot be dismissed. 
  
51  Hon Steven Joyce and Hon Judith Collins Making Tax Simpler: Better Administration of Social Policy (Policy 
and Strategy, Inland Revenue, July 2017); Inland Revenue Department "Proposals to improve social policy" 
(17 July 2017) <taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz>; and Inland Revenue Department "Archived websites: Making tax 
simpler" <taxpolicy.ird.govt.nz>. See also the Best Start tax credit, legislated for via the Families Package 
(Income Tax and Benefits) Act 2017; Inland Revenue Department "Best Start" <www.ird.govt.nz>; Work 
and Income "Families Package" (14 December 2017) <www.workandincome.govt.nz>; and Inland Revenue 
Department "Can I get Working for Families?" <www.ird.govt.nz>. 
52  Ron Paterson Warrant of Fitness: An Independent Review of the Veteran's Support Act 2014 (March 2018). 
53  Gail E Duncan Economic Review of the Status of Beneficiaries in New Zealand (10 August 2018). 
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H Lessons for Policy-makers 
There are important lessons for policymakers embedded in the New Zealand experience with the 
accident compensation scheme. Unexpected results come with any scheme of this character. Lofty 
aims can easily be blown off course. Changing political ideologies, administrative blunders and 
constant legislative fiddling over time lead to incoherence. 
Claimants have encountered serious difficulties in securing quick and fair decisions from a 
scheme that promised to provide decisions without technicality. Lines have to be drawn as the policy 
now stands, but those lines between injury and disease are frequently problematic and seem unfair to 
claimants. 
The ACC scheme has made a major impact on the public health system. It provides funds for 
private medical providers by paying for treatment in private hospital and rehabilitation services, thus 
getting people back to work more quickly than could be achieved by the public health system. In this 
way the scheme has challenged the public health system  and assisted private health providers. 
The scheme has certainly improved the plight of accident victims compared to what was available 
at common law. Many more people can claim and have their hardship relieved. Yet there have been 
persistent criticisms of ACC in recent years about how the lines that are drawn, how medical issues 
are assessed and many changes in administration. In the last few years, the decisions of ACC have 
become more restrictive, similar to liability insurance not social insurance and less people-oriented. 
At its inception the scheme created two classes: those who are injured who are treated more 
generously than those who are sick or otherwise disabled. The Woodhouse Report made clear the 
recommended scheme was to be a temporary order of things. Until the discrimination the present 
scheme creates is removed, social justice will not have been achieved.  
The abandonment of tort actions remains the legally most significant aspect of the scheme, and 
the policy of rejecting the tort system has been a constant feature of the New Zealand landscape since 
the enactment of the scheme. In no other common law jurisdiction has that policy advance been 
achieved. The policy in New Zealand has survived several attacks upon it. All sides of politics seem 
unanimous on not reintroducing tort litigation for personal injury. 
The ultimate issue that is raised by the accident compensation scheme in New Zealand is one of 
social philosophy. The 1967 Woodhouse Report was based on the principle of community 
responsibility. The question is how should that principle be translated for a different world more than 
fifty years after the Report? We do not seem to be willing to grasp the nettle and design what a rational 
and humane system of income support looks like.  Fairness demands a policy response and one that 
is properly worked through. That is what the Woodhouse legacy is saying to us, if only we would 
listen.    
The Woodhouse vision was admirable, the performance of the scheme that was adopted improved 
matters substantially for accident victims but there is unfinished business. The future remains 
uncertain. We need now a fresh infusion of Woodhouse boldness and vision. 
